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a b s t r a c t
In the traditional identity-based cryptography, when a user holds multiple identities as
its public keys, it has to manage an equal number of private keys. The recent advances
of identity-based cryptography allow a single private key to map multiple public keys
(identities) that are selectable by the user. This approach simplifies the private key
management. Unfortunately, the existing schemes have a heavy computation overhead,
since the private key generator has to authenticate all identities in order to generate a
resultant private key. In particular, it has been considered as a drawback that the data size
for a user is proportional to the number of associated identities. Moreover, these schemes
do not allow dynamic changes of user identities. When a user upgrades its identities, the
private key generator (PKG) has to authenticate the identities and generate a new private
key. To overcome these problems, in this paper we present an efficient dynamic identity-
based key exchange protocol with selectable identities, and prove its security under the
bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [1]. The idea is to allow a user identity
to serve as a public key. The corresponding private key is created by binding the identity string with a master secret of
a trusted authority called the private key generator (PKG). Due to its advantage in key management in comparison to
the traditional PKI-based cryptography, identity-based cryptography has received a lot of attention. The introduction of
pairings to cryptography [2,3] opened up an entirely new field for identity-based cryptography. Many novel identity-based
key agreement protocols from pairings have been introduced and proved in different security models (e.g., [4–9]).
In an identity-based system, a private key is created by binding an identity string and the master key of PKG. An obvious
key management issue arises, when a user holds multiple identities, as multiple identities lead to multiple private keys.
Moreover, using multiple private keys and public keys in key agreement could result in high computational complexity.
To simplify private key management for a user with multiple identities, we seek a solution where multiple identities are
associated with a single private key. Recently, Guo et al. [10,11] introduced an encryption scheme that captures the features
of multiple identities. However the security proof in [10] is pointed out to be incorrect [12]. Furthermore, [12] presented a
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new authenticated key agreement protocol with selectable identities. To prove the security of their scheme in the random
oraclemodel, they also introduced a new assumption called the k-multiple bilinear collision attack assumption (k-MBCAA1).
Unfortunately, the Guo et al. scheme [12] is inefficient in terms of the computation cost. Suppose that user A has m
identities and B has n identities and that A chooses k identities as B’s public key. During a key agreement process, A has
to generate n data items for exchange and carry out (k + 1)n scalar multiplications and kn addition operations in ellipse
curves. Furthermore, in their scheme, the PKG has to authenticate all identities and generate a resultant private key for a
user. This would be a burden to the PKG for a large group of users. We also notice that their scheme is not dynamic. When
a new identity is added or an old identity is canceled, the corresponding private key will become invalid and a new private
key needs to be issued by the PKG. This implies that the PKG has to re-authenticate the identities that it has authenticated
before, as these data are not recorded. In a dynamic environment where users change some of their identities from time to
time, their scheme is not practical because PKG needs to be ‘‘online’’, which is not desirable for the PKG.
We observed that identities for a user can be classed as permanent and temporary in the real world. For example, the
birthday and the identity card number are permanent identities, while the mobile phone number and the student card
number might be temporary identities. When user A wants to establish a session key with user B, he could just select a
permanent identity and several temporary identities, instead of all identities, from B’s identity set as B’s public key. For
example, when Awants to purchase something from an online shop, she only needs to choose B’s (as a seller) identity card
number, and mobile phone number as B’s public keys. The staff from the Traffic Management Bureau could choose just B’s
identity card number, driver’s license number, email address and other related identities as B’s public key.
In this paper, we present an efficient dynamic identity-based key agreement protocol with selectable identities. The key
idea is that we use a private key corresponding to a permanent identity as the user’s private key. Using this private key, a
user with multiple identities can establish a shared session key with another user. As a result, our scheme has the following
features:
• The PKG avoids authenticating all of the identities when generating a private key for a user. It only needs to authenticate
one identity and generate a private key for the user corresponding to this identity at the beginning of the setup stage.
After that, PKG can be ‘‘offline’’ as in other identity-based schemes.
• Our scheme achieves the dynamic property. A user can add, delete, or update temporary identities at will, which will not
affect its private key.
• Our scheme is efficient in terms of the computation cost. In our scheme, A only needs to generate k messages (k ≤ n,
where by nwe denote the number of identities that a user holds), and needs to do k scalar multiplications and k addition
operations. The computation cost is only related to k, which is generally small in the real world.
• The security of our scheme can be reduced to the bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption, which is a standard assumption
and is weaker than the ‘‘k-multiple bilinear collision attack assumption (k-MBCAA1)’’ used in the proof of the scheme
in [12].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the preliminaries including bilinear pairing,
security assumption and the security model. In Section 3, we present a multi-identity key agreement protocol. In Section 4,
we prove the security of the multi-identity key agreement protocol. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the background knowledge that will be used for our scheme. We give the basic definition
and properties of bilinear pairings, the computational problems and the security model.
2.1. The bilinear map and security assumption
We first revisit the basic definition of bilinear map and the bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem. The details can be found
in [3].
The bilinearmap eˆ is defined over two groups of the same prime order q denoted byG andGT inwhich the computational
Diffie–Hellman problem is hard. More formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map). Let G be an additive group of prime order q and GT a multiplicative group of the same order.
Let P denote a generator ofG. An admissible pairing is a bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ GT which has the following properties:
• Bilinear: given Q , R ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have eˆ(aQ , bR) = eˆ(Q , R)ab.
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(P, P) ≠ 1GT .• Computable: eˆ is efficiently computable.
Typically, the map eˆ can be derived from either the Weil pairing or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
More details on how these groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected in practice for efficiency and security
can be found in [3,13,14].
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2.2. Computational problems
The bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) problem, which
was introduced by Boneh and Franklin [3].
Definition 2 (BDH). Let G and GT be two groups of a prime order q ≥ 2k, where k is security parameter. Let P ∈ G∗ be a
generator ofG. Suppose that there exists a bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ GT . LetABDH be an attacker modeled as a probabilistic
Turing machine taking the security parameter k as input. Suppose that a, b and c are uniformly chosen at random from Z∗q
and aP, bP and cP are computed.ABDH is to solve the following problem:
Given (G,GT , q, eˆ, P, aP, bP, cP), compute eˆ(P, P)abc .
We defineABDH’s success probability as
SuccBDHG,ABDH(k) = Pr[ABDH outputs eˆ(P, P)abc].
We denote by SuccBDHG (tBDH) the maximal success probability Succ
BDH
G,ABDH(k) over all attackers having running time bounded
by tBDH which is polynomial in the security parameter k.
Definition 3 (Negligible Function). A real-valued function f (l) is negligible if for any polynomial p(x), there exists N > 0
such that when l > N, |f (l)| < lp(n) always holds.
The BDH problem is said to be computationally intractable if SuccBDHG (tBDH) is negligible in k.
2.3. Security models
In this paper, we shall adopt a modified security model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [15] to analyze the security of
ourmulti-identity key exchange protocol. Themodel includes a set of parties and each party involved in a session ismodeled
by an oracle. An oracleΠ si,j denotes an instance of a party i involved with a partner party j in a session swhere the instance
of the party j isΠ tj,i for some t . These parties cannot communicate directly; instead they only communicate with each other
via an adversary. An adversary can access the oracle by issuing some specified queries as follows.
Send(Π si,j,m): This query models an active attack.Π
s
i,j executes the protocol and responds with an outgoing message x
or a decision to indicate accepting or rejecting the session. If the oracle Π si,j does not exist, it will be created. Note that if
m = λ, then the oracle is generated as an initiator; otherwise, as a responder.
Reveal(Π si,j): Π
s
i,j returns the session key as its response if the oracle accepts. Otherwise, it returns ⊥. Such an oracle is
called opened.
Corrupt(i): The party i responds with its private key.
Test(Π si,j): At some point, the adversary can make a Test query to a fresh oracle Π
s
i,j. Π
s
i,j, as a challenger, randomly
chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the real agreed session key, if b = 0; otherwise it returns a random sample generated
according to the distribution of the session key.
The security of a protocol is defined using the two-phase gameG played between amalicious adversaryA and a collection
of oracles. At the first stage,A is able to send the above first three oracle queries at will. Then, at some point,Awill choose
a fresh sessionΠ si,j on which to be tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. After this
point, the adversary can continue querying the oracles but cannot reveal the test oracle or its partner, and cannot corrupt
the entity j. Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b′ for b. We say that A wins if the adversary
guesses the correct b.
Define the advantage ofA as
AdvA(k) = |2 Pr[b′ = b] − 1|,
where k is a security parameter.
The fresh oracle in the game is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Fresh Oracle [16]). An oracle Π si,j is called fresh if (1) Π
s
i,j has accepted; (2) Π
s
i,j is unopened; (3) j ≠ i is not
corrupted; (4) there is no opened oracleΠ tj,i, which has had a matching conversation toΠ
s
i,j.
In this work, we use the concatenation of the messages in a session to define the session ID, and thus to define the
matching conversation, i.e., two oraclesΠ si,j andΠ
t
j,i have a matching conversation with each other if both of them have the
same session ID.
A secure authenticated key agreement protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 5. ProtocolΠ is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol, if:
• In the presence of the benign adversary (who faithfully relays messages between parties), forΠ si,j andΠ tj,i, both oracles
always accept holding the same session key and this key is distributed uniformly at random on session key space.
• For every probability polynomial time (PPT) adversaryA,AdvA(k) is negligible.
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Asmentioned in [9], if a protocol is proved to be secure with respect to the above definition, then it achieves implicit mutual
key authentication and the basic security properties, i.e., known session key security, key-compromise impersonation
resilience and unknown key-share resilience.
3. A multi-identity key agreement protocol
In this section, we present amulti-identity key exchange protocol. Suppose two parties A and Bwant to establish a shared
session key using this protocol. A holdsm IDs (IDA,1, IDA,2, . . . , IDA,m) and B holds n IDs (IDB,1, IDB,2, . . . , IDB,n).
3.1. The scheme
Our scheme consists of three algorithms: Setup, Extract and Key Agreement.
• Setup:
– On input of a security parameter k, the PKG generates a prime q, two groups G,GT of order q and a bilinear pairing
eˆ : G× G→ GT .
– The PKG randomly chooses P,Q ∈ G, s ∈ Z∗q and two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗ and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. Then, PKG sets Ppub,1 = sP and Ppub,2 = sQ to be the public keys of PKG. s is set as the master key.
– PKG publishes system parameters
param = ⟨q,G,GT , eˆ, P,Q , Ppub,1, Ppub,2H1,H2⟩
and keeps master key s secret.
• Extract: Suppose a user A has a permanent identity, written as IDA,1. When A requires the corresponding private key from
PKG, PKG takes as input params, master key s and the identity IDA,1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, generates the private key dA = sH1(IDA,1)
and sends it to user A by a private authenticated channel.
• Key Agreement: Suppose that user A is an initiator and B is an intended partner. A chooses k′ identities IDB,i′(i′ ∈ {1,
2, . . . , n}) as B’s public key. Similarly, B chooses k identities IDA,i(i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}) as A’s public key. Note that IDA,1
and IDB,1 must be involved in their public keys. A and B have the private key as dA = sH1(IDA,1) and dB = sH1(IDB,1)
corresponding to the identities IDA,1 and IDB,1, respectively. Let QA,i = H1(IDA,i) and QB,i′ = H1(IDB,i′).
To establish a shared session secret key, A and B conduct the following tasks:
– A chooses a random number r1 ∈ Z∗q . Then A computes r1P and r1(Q +QB,i′) (i′ = 2, . . . , k′). A sends TA = (r1P, r1(Q +
QB,i′)) to B.
– B chooses a random number r2 ∈ Z∗q . Then B computes r2P and r2(Q + QA,i) (i = 2, . . . , k). B sends TB = (r2P, r2(Q +
QA,i)) to A.
– After receiving message TB, A conducts the following tasks:
∗ Define a (k+ 1)× (k+ 1)matrix Ak as follows:
Ak =

α0
α1
α2
...
αk
 =

0 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
1 0 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
1 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1
 .
In the matrix, α0 = (0, 1, . . . , 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) with k+ 1 elements. In αi (1 ≤ i ≤ k), only the first element and the
ith element are 1. Other elements are set to 0.
Let (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1) be the solution of the following equation:
X × Ak = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
∗ Compute
MA = (x3, x4, . . . , xk+1)×

r2(Q + QA,2)
r2(Q + QA,3)
...
r2(Q + QA,k)

= r2(x3(Q + QA,2)+ x4(Q + QA,3)+ · · · + xk+1(Q + QA,k))
= r2((x3 + x4 + · · · + xk+1)Q + x3QA,2 + x4QA,3 + · · · + xk+1QA,k).
∗ Compute the session secrets as
KAB,1 = eˆ(r2P, x2Ppub2 + (x1 + x2)dA) · eˆ(Ppub1 ,MA) · eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k′−
i′=1
QB,i′
r1
,
KAB,2 = r1 · r2P = r1r2P.
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• After receiving message TA, B conducts similar tasks and obtains the session secrets as
KBA,1 = eˆ(r1P, x′2Ppub2 + (x′1 + x′2)dB) · eˆ(Ppub1 ,MB) · eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k−
i=1
QA,i
r2
,
KBA,2 = r2 · r1P = r1r2P.
3.2. Correctness
Now we verify the correctness of the protocol. Take user A as an example.
Since
(x1, x2, . . . , xk+1)×

QA,1
Q + QA,1
Q + QA,2
...
Q + QA,k
 = x1QA,1 + x2(Q + QA,1)+ x3(Q + QA,2)+ · · · + xk+1(Q + QA,k)
= (x2 + x3 + · · · + xk+1)Q + (x1 + x2)QA,1 + x3QA,2 + · · · + xk+1QA,k
= Q + QA,1 + QA,2 + · · · + QA,k,
A computes
K 1AB,1 = eˆ(r2P, x2Ppub2 + (x1 + x2)dA) · eˆ(Ppub1 ,MA)
= eˆ(sP, r2(x2Q + (x1 + x2)QA,1)) · eˆ(Ppub1 , r2((x3 + · · · + xk+1)Q + x3QA,2 + · · · + xk+1QA,k))
= eˆ(Ppub1 , (x2 + x3 + · · · + xk+1)Q + (x1 + x2)QA,1 + x3QA,2 + · · · + xk+1QA,k)r2
= eˆ(Ppub1 ,Q + QA,1 + QA,2 + · · · + QA,k)r2
= eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k−
i=1
QA,i
r2
.
Finally, A computes its first session secret as
KAB,1 = eˆ(r2P, x2Ppub2 + (x1 + x2)dA) · eˆ(Ppub1 ,MA) · eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k′−
i′=1
QB,i′
r1
= eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k−
i=1
QA,i
r2
· eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k′−
i′=1
QB,i′
r1
.
Similarly, B can compute its first session secret as
KBA,1 = eˆ(r1P, x′2Ppub2 + (x′1 + x′2)dB) · eˆ(Ppub1 ,MB)eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k−
i=1
QA,i
r2
= eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k−
i=1
QA,i
r2
· eˆ

Ppub1 ,Q +
k′−
i′=1
QB,i′
r1
.
Thus, the two secret keys computed by A and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully established the shared key
K1 = KAB,1 = KBA,1 and K2 = KAB,2 = KBA,2 after running an instance of the protocol. The final shared session key is then
sk = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1‖K2).
4. Security analysis
Theorem 6. If H1 and H2 are random oracles and the BDH assumption holds, then our dynamic multi-identity scheme is a secure
key agreement protocol. In particular, suppose A is an adversary that attacks the multi-identity scheme in the random oracle
model with non-negligible probability ϵ and makes at most q1, q2 queries to H1 and H2, respectively, and creates at most qo
oracles. Then there exists an algorithmB for solving the BDH problem with advantage
AdvBDHB ≥
1
q1 · qo · q2 · ϵ.
Proof. Firstly, we define Session ID as a concatenation of TA ‖ TB. We focus on how to construct an algorithm B using the
adversaryA to solve a BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
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Given an instance of the BDH problem
⟨q, k,G,GT , eˆ, P, aP, bP, cP⟩
where eˆ is a bilinear pairing eˆ : G× G→ GT ,B’s task is computing eˆ(P, P)abc .
Setup:B simulates the Setup algorithm as follows:
B chooses a random value y ∈ Z∗q and computes Q = yP . ThenB sets Ppub,1 = aP and computes Ppub,2 = aQ = ayP =
yaP where a is the master key which is unknown to the simulator. After that,B chooses two hash functions H1 and H2, and
sends the systemparameters ⟨q,G,GT , eˆ, P,Q , Ppub,1, Ppub,2,H1,H2⟩ toA. The hash functionsH1 andH2 are randomoracles
controlled byB.
AlgorithmB randomly chooses I ∈R{1, . . . , q1} and J ∈R{1, . . . , q0} and begins its simulation. Here we should note that
the notation IDi,u means the uth chosen identity of user i, andΠ si,j is the sth oracle among all the created oracles. Also note
that nti,j means the number of the identities that i chooses from j’s identities set in this session. Algorithm B answers the
queries which are asked by adversaryA in arbitrary order as follows.
H1(IDi,u) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list H list1 with entries of the form (i, IDi,u, hi,u, di). When A
queries the oracle H1 at a point IDi,u,B responds to the query as follows:
If IDi,u already appears on H list1 in a tuple (i, IDi,u, hi,u, di), thenB responds with H1(IDi,u) = hi,u.
If IDi,u is the Ith unique query to H1 where (i, u) = (I, 1), thenB stores (i, IDi,u, bP,⊥) into the tuple list and responds
with H1(IDi,u) = bP .
If IDi,u is the query to H1 where (i, u) = (i, 1), then B randomly selects li,1 and computes H1(IDi,1) = hi,u = li,1P and
di = li,1aP . After thatB stores (i, IDi,1, hi,1, di) into the tuple list and responds with H1(IDi,u) = hi,u.
Otherwise, B checks the tuple indexed by (i, IDi,1, hi,1, di). If such a tuple is not in the list, then B queries H1(IDi,1).
Otherwise,B randomly selects li,u ∈ Z∗q and computes H1(IDi,u) = hi,u = li,uP .B inserts (i, IDi,u, hi,u, di) into the tuple list
and responds with H1(IDi,u) = hi,u.
H2(IDi, IDj, T ti , T
t
j , K
t
1, Z
t)queries:Bmaintains an initially empty listH list2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, T
t
i , T
t
j , K
t
1, Z
t , ζ t)
which is indexed by (IDi, IDj, T ti , T
t
j , K
t
1, Z
t).B responds to the query in the following way.
• If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K t1, Z t) is on the list, thenB responds with ζ t .
• Otherwise,B goes though the listL to find a tuple (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj ,Π ti,j) and proceeds as follows.
– Test whether eˆ(m
T ti
1 ,m
T tj
1 ) = eˆ(P, Z t) holds wheremT
t
i
1 andm
T tj
1 mean the first messages from Ti and Tj, respectively. If
the equation holds,B does the following:
∗ Find the values f ti,j and SK ti,j corresponding to oracleΠ ti,j from the listΩ in the Send query.
∗ Find the value ltj,u from H list1 for the party with IDj.∗ Compute the shared secret via the following equation:
K tij,1 = eˆ(m
T tj
1 , (x1)
t
i,jyaP + ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
aP,Q + nti,j−
u=1
Qj,u
f
t
i,ja
= eˆ(mT
t
j
1 , (x1)
t
i,jyaP) · eˆ

bP,
1
f ti,j
Zt
(x1)ti,j+(x2)ti,j
· eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
aP,
y+ nti,j−
u=1
lj,u
 f ti,jaP
 .
Note that Π ti,j is put on the list L in the Reveal query only when Π
t
i,j has been revealed and di = abP , but
H2(IDi, IDj, T ti , T
t
j , K
t
1, Z
t) had not been queried before the Reveal query. So, SK ti,j has been randomly sampled.
∗ Set ζ t = SK ti,j.
∗ Remove (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj ,Π ti,j) from the listL. Put (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K t1, Z t , ζ t) into the list H list2 .
∗ Return SK ti,j.
– Otherwise,B chooses ζ t ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K t1, Z t , ζ t) into the list and returns ζ t .
• Otherwise,B chooses ζ t ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K t1, Z t , ζ t) into the list and returns ζ t .
Corrupt(i) queries: When receiving this query, B goes through list H list1 . If i is not on the list, B queries H1(IDi,1). B checks
the value of di. If di =⊥, thenB aborts the game (Event 1). Otherwise,B sends di toA.
Send(Π ti,j, (m1,m2, . . . ,mnsj,i)) queries: B maintains a list Ω for each oracle of the form (Π
t
i,j, tran
t
i,j, r
t
i,j, K
t
ij,1, K
t
ij,2, SK
t
i,j).
tranti,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; r
t
i,j is the random integer used by the oracle to generate the messages; K
t
ij,1, K
t
ij,2
and SK ti,j are set as⊥ initially. This list is updated in other queries as well.B proceeds in the following way:
B looks through the list H list1 . If j is not on the list,B queries H1(IDj,u)where u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nti,j}.
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B checks t . If t = J,B checks the value of dj and gives different responses depending on it, as below.
• If dj ≠⊥,B aborts the game (Event 2).
• Otherwise, compute c(yP + lj,uP) = (y + lj,u)cP where u ∈ {2, . . . , nti,j} and lj,u can be found from H list1 . Respond with
them along with cP and set r ti,j = ⊥.
If t ≠ J,B proceeds with the protocol as follows.
• If di ≠ ⊥, randomly sample r ti,j ∈ Z∗q and respond with r ti,jP, r ti,j(yP + lj,uP)where u ∈ {i, . . . , nti,j}.
• Otherwise, randomly sample f ti,j ∈ Z∗q and respond with f ti,jaP, f ti,ja(yP + lj,uP) = f ti,j(y + lj,u)aP where u ∈ {i, . . . , nti,j}.
Set r ti,j = ⊥.
Reveal(Π ti,j) queries:B maintains a listLwith tuples of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj,Π
t
i,j).B answers the queries as follows:
• Get the tuple of oracleΠ ti,j fromΩ .
• If oracleΠ ti,j has not accepted, respond with⊥.
• If t = J or if the Jth oracle has been generated as Π Ja,b and IDa = IDj, IDb = IDi and two oracles have the same session
ID, abort the game (Event 3).
• If SK ti,j ≠ ⊥, return SK ti,j.• Otherwise:
– If ri,j ≠ ⊥, compute
Kij,1 = eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP + ((x1)i,jt + (x2)i,jt )di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
aP, yP + nti,j−
u=1
lj,u
r
t
i,j
,
where
M ti,j = ((x3)ti,j, (x4)ti,j, . . . , (xnsj,i+1)ti,j)×

m2
m3
...
mnsj,i

and mu (u ∈ {1, . . . ,mnsj,i}) are the received messages on tranti,j. By making an H2 query, set SK ti,j = H2(IDi, IDj, T ti ,
T tj , Kij,1, r
t
i,jm1) where T
t
i = (r ti,jP, r ti,j(yP + lj,2P), . . . , r ti,j(yP + lj,nsi,jP)) and T tj = (m1, . . . ,mnsj,i) if Π ti,j is an initiator
oracle, or SK ti,j = H2(IDj, IDi, T tj , T ti , Kij,1, r ti,jm1) otherwise, and update Ω by putting SK ti,j and return SK ti,j as the
response.
– Otherwise, it should have di = abP . Since B does not know di and should not be able to compute eˆ(m1, abP), thus it
should not be able to compute K tij,1.B proceeds as follows:∗ Go though the list H2 to find a tuple (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K tij,1, Z t) if IDi is the initiator or a tuple (IDj, IDi, T tj , T ti , K tij,1, Z t)
otherwise, meeting the equation eˆ(f ti,jaP,m1) = eˆ(P, Zu). If such a Zu is found, then compute
K tij,1 = eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP + ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
Ppub,Q + nti,j−
u=1
Qj,u
f
t
i,ja
= eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP) · eˆ(m1, ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j)eˆ
Ppub,Q + nti,j−
u=1
Qj,u
f
t
i,ja
= eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP) · eˆ

bP,
1
f ti,j
Z t
(x1)ti,j+(x2)ti,j
· eˆ(aP,M ti,j)eˆ
aP, y+ msj,1−
u=1
lj,u
 f ti,jaP
and set SK ti,j = H2(IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj , K tij,1, Z t)where T ti = (r ti,jP, r ti,j(yP+ lj,1P), . . . , r ti,j(yP+ lj,nti,jP)) and T tj = (m1, . . . ,
mnsj,i) ifΠ
t
i,j is an initiator oracle, or SK
t
i,j = H2(IDj, IDi, T tj , T ti , K tij,1, Z t) otherwise.
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample SK ti,j ∈ {0, 1}n; put (IDi, IDj, T ti , T tj ,Π ti,j) if IDi is the initiator or (IDj, IDi, T tj , T ti ,Π ti,j)
into listL.
∗ B returns SK ti,j as the response and updatesΩ by putting SK ti,j.
Test(Π ti,j) query: If t ≠ J or (t = J but) there is an oracleΠ sj,i which has the same session ID asΠ ti,j that has been revealed,
B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise,B responds toAwith a random number ζ ∈ {0, 1}n.
AfterA finishes the queries, it returns its guess. ThenB proceeds with the following steps:
Compute
D = eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP + ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di)eˆ(aP,M ti,j),
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where m1 is the first incoming message and M ti,j can be computed from the rest of the incoming messages. Also note that
di = li,1aP where li,1 ≠ ⊥ and can be found from H list1 corresponding to identifier IDi.
Note that
K Ji,j = D · eˆ
Ppub,Q + nti,j−
u=1
Qj,u
c
= D · eˆ
aP, yP + bP + nti,j−
u=2
lj,uP
c
= D · eˆ
aP, yP + nti,j−
u=2
lj,ucP
 · eˆ(aP, bP)c
= D · eˆ
aP, yP + nti,j−
u=2
lj,ucP
 · eˆ(P, P)abc .
B randomly samples Kl from the H list2 , and responds with
Kl
D · eˆ
aP, yP + nti,j−
u=2
lj,ucP

to the BDH challenge.
Claim 7. If B did not abort the game,A could not find inconsistency between the simulation and the real world. More precisely, if
A noticed the inconsistency between the simulation and the real world whenB did not abort the simulation, then the probability
that B solves the BDH problem is non-negligible.
Proof. B gives the satisfying response to most of the oracles by following the protocol specification honestly, except for
the one Π ti,j whose private key is abP and H(IDi,1) = bP and where the incoming messages (m1,m2, . . . ,mnsj,i) are from
the tested oracle wherem1 = cP . Note that the transcripts are one part of the input to H2 which is modeled as the random
oracle in order to compute the session key. If there is some difference between the Reveal query onΠ ti,j and a query on H2,
it must have queried H2 withΠ ti,j such that
K tij,1 = eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP + ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ(aP,Q + Qj,1 + · · · + Qj,nti,j)
rti,j
= eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP) · eˆ(m1, ((x1)ti,j + (x2)ti,j)di) · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
aP,Q + nti,j−
u=1
lj,uP
r
t
i,j
= eˆ(cP, (x1)ti,jyaP) · eˆ(cP, abP)(x1)
t
i,j+(x2)ti,j · eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ
aP,Q + nti,j−
u=1
lj,uP
r
t
i,j
.
If A can distinguish the session key K tij,1 in the simulation from the real world, then B can return

Kl/

eˆ(cP, (x1)ti,jyaP) ·
eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ

aP,
∑nti,j
u=1 lj,uP
rti,j 1(x1)ti,j+(x2)ti,j as the response to the BDH challenge with probability 1q2 , where Kl is a random
value chosen from H2 byB. This completes the proof. 
Claim 8. During the simulation, the probability that B did not abort the game is non-negligible.
Proof. We now evaluate the probability thatB did not abort during the game, i.e., Events 1–4 did not happen.B aborts the
game only when at least one of the following events happens:
1. Event 1, denoted as F1:A corrupted party iwhose private key is represented by⊥, i.e.,Amade a query to party i to get
its private key if it choseΠ sj,i as the fresh oracle, which is disallowed according to the definition of the fresh oracle.
2. Event 2, denoted as F2:A impersonated party iwhose private key is represented by⊥ in the sth session.
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3. Event 3, denoted as F3: A revealed the Jth oracle or its partner oracle, which goes against the definition of the fresh
oracle.
4. Event 4, denoted asF4:A did not choose the Jth oracle as the challenge fresh oracle or the partner of the fresh oracle has
been revealed, which made it such that the Test query cannot work.
According to the rules of the game, we have
¬F4 ∧ ¬F2 → ¬F1
and
¬F4 → ¬F3.
Now, let F be the event thatB did not abort during the game. Then, we get
Pr[F ] = Pr[¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 ∧ ¬F3 ∧ ¬F4]
= Pr[¬F2 ∧ ¬F4]
= Pr[¬F2] · Pr[¬F4]
≥ 1
q1
· 1
qo
= 1
q1 · qo . 
Claim 9. LetH be the event that K = eˆ(m1, (x1)ti,jyaP+((x1)ti,j+(x2)ti,j)di)eˆ(aP,M ti,j) · eˆ

aP,Q+∑msj,1u=1 Qj,uc was not queried
on H2. Then Pr[¬H] ≥ ϵ.
Proof. Like in the analysis of [17], we have
Pr[Awins|H] ≤ 1
2
.
Thus
Pr[Awins] = Pr[Awins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[Awins|H] · Pr[H]
≤ Pr[Awins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[Awins|H]
≤ 1
2
Pr[¬H] + 1
2
.
So we have
Pr[¬H] ≥ 2

Pr[Awins] − 1
2

= ϵ.
Thus, the claim is correct. 
Let I be the event thatB found the correct Kl. Then combining all of the above results, we have
Pr[B wins] = Pr[F ∧ ¬H ∧ I]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q2 · Pr[¬H]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q2 · ϵ,
which contradicts the hardness of the BDH problem.
This completes the security analysis of the protocol. 
5. Conclusion
We proposed a novel selectable identity authenticated key agreement protocol to optimize public key/private key
management for a user with multiple identities. We proved our scheme in the random oracle model and for the Bilinear
Diffie–Hellman assumption. Our protocol demonstrated an obvious advantage in comparison with other schemes. Our
protocol is highly efficient in terms of computation cost and storage cost. Moreover, our scheme is dynamic, since it allows
a user to add, delete, or update its temporary identities. These features are important especially for some special networks,
such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and tactical networks which are very dynamic and have significant bandwidth
and power constraints.
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